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JURISDICTION 
This Court has Jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. § 78A-3-102(3)(a). 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the Court of Appeal err in concluding that Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution does not require a separate showing of exigent circumstances when police 
officers possess probable cause to search a vehicle? 
Standard of Review. "Interpretation of the Utah Constitution is a question of 
law." State v. Hernandez, 2011 UT 70, 268 P.3d 822 (2011). Thus this court reviews the 
Court of Appeal decision giving no deference to its legal conclusions. Id. 
Preservation. The Court of Appeals issued its ruling on March 3rd 2016, the 
;;; Appellant's Petition for Certiorari was granted by this Court July 6th 2016. This issue 
was preserved at the trial court as part of the plea negotiations between Mr. Rigby and the 
State. Specifically Mr. Rigby reserved his right to appeal, the denial of his motion to 
suppress, in his statement of Defendant Entering a Guilty Plea. R. 94. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
UT Const. Art. I, § 14. 
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant 
shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized." 
The interpretation of unreasonable searches in this provision will be determinative of this 
appeal. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below. 
This is a criminal case. Mr. Rigby was pulled over in his vehicle and charged with 
Driving with a measurable controlled substance in the body, possession or use of a 
controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and failure to stop. R. 1-2. Mr. 
Rigby brought a motion to suppress the evidence against him that was seized in a 
warrantless search of his car. R. 39-44. After a hearing the Court denied the motion to 
suppress. R. 78. Through negotiations Mr. Rigby plead guilty to Driving with a 
measurable controlled substance in the body, and Possession or Use of a controlled 
substance, both Class B. Misdemeanors. R. 94. Mr. Rigby reserved the right to appeal 
the denial of his motion to suppress. Id. 
The Court of Appeals issued its opinion on March 3rd 2016, upholding the District 
Court's denial of the Defendant's motion. State v. Rigby, 2016 UT app 42, -P.3d-. 
II. Statement of Facts. 
For purposes of Mr. Rigby1s motion to suppress and by extension this appeal both 
parties agreed to accept the facts as recorded in Officer Groves police report. See Def. 
Mot. to Sup. R. 43, and States Mem. in Opp. R. 52, & 58-62. Mr. Rigby1s summary of 
relevant facts is as follows: 
1. Officer Groves, observed Mr. Rigby's "suspicious 11 SUV in the Gateway 
Apartments parking lot. R. 59. 
2 
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2. Officer Groves followed the SUV as it left the parking lot and followed it for 
several blocks. Id. 
3. Mr. Rigby was stopped after an alleged stop sign violation on or about March 28th 
2013.Id. 
4. The officer claimed he could smell the odor of burnt and fresh marijuana coming 
from the vehicle. Id. 
5. The Officer called for backup which arrived prior to the search. R. 60. 
6. A K9 unit was called out and the K9 indicated on the vehicle. R. 60. 
7. The Officer's vehicle was equipped with a laptop and printer which would have 
allowed him to obtain an electronic warrant to search the vehicle pursuant to Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 40(1). R. 80. 
8. The Officer was in possession of a cellular telephone which would have allowed 
him to obtain a telephonic warrant to search the vehicle pursuant to Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure Rule 40(1). Id. 
9. The officer made no efforts to obtain a warrant prior to searching the Defendant's 
vehicle. R. 58-62. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Constitution and the United States Constitution both provide protection 
against unreasonable searches. The Utah Courts have decided that although both contain 
almost identical language the State of Utah can and has interpreted the Utah 
Constitution's provision differently to increase the protection of its citizens. Prior to 1996 
3 
both constitutions required probable cause and exigent circumstances to justify a 
warrantless search of an automobile. However in 1996 the U.S. Supreme Court changed 
the requirements under the U.S. Constitution to require probably cause only. No such 
decision has been issued regarding the status of the Utah Constitution Thus it continues to 
require exigent circumstances to justify the search of an automobile. 
The Court of Appeals decision relies incorrectly on the lockstep model, of 
addressing state constitutional claims instead of the primacy model wish has been 
encouraged and adopted by this Court. Further the rule adopted by the Court of appeals 
effectively destroys any distinction between our State and Federal constitutions and 
implicitly applies all, current and future, Federal 4th amendment ruling's to Article I, 
Section I 4 of the Utah Constitution. This Court should find that the protections afforded 
by the Utah constitution were not lowered by the Federal Court and thus an officer must 
have a separate showing of exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless search of an 
automobile. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
Although the U.S. Constitution and the Utah Constitution contain almost 
identical protections against unreasonable searches the Utah Constitution 
provides a greater protection to its citizens. 
Both the Utah Constitution and the Constitution of the United States of America 
provide protections against police intrusion into the lives of their citizens. Utah 
Constitution Article 1 Section I 4 reads: 
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant 
4 
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shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized." 
Similarly the Fourth amendment of the United States Constitution states: 
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrant 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized." 
This Court stated in 1988 that it "has never drawn any distinctions between the 
protections afforded by the respective constitutional provisions. Rather the Court has 
always considered the protections afforded to be one and the same." State v. Watts, 750 
P.2d 1219 at I 22 I (Utah 1988). The Watts court reserved the right to distinguish between 
the protections afforded by the two Constitutions, especially if necessary to "insulat[e] 
this state's citizens from the vagaries of inconsistent interpretations given to the fourth 
amendment by the federal courts.'' Id. footnote 8. 
This Court has, on at least three separate occasions since the Watt case, held that 
the Utah constitution provides a higher level of protection than the Federal Constitution . 
..d See State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991), State v. Lorocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 
1990); and State v. DeBooy, 996 P.2d 546 (Utah 2000). 
In February of 1996, this Court considered whether or not it was necessary to 
differentiate between the two constitutional provisions when it came to the search of an 
automobile. State v. Anderson, 910 p.2d 1229 (Utah I 996). In Anderson the Court went 
into great detail to explain that under both the Federal and Utah constitutions the 
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warrantless search of an automobile required "both probable cause and exigent 
circumstances". Id. at 1236. Having found that both constitutions had the same 
requirement the majority opinion declined a separate analyses of Utah Constitutional law. 
As if to illustrate the need to "insulat[e] this state's citizens from the vagaries of 
inconsistent interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the federal courts." Watts, 
at Footnote 8. In July of 1996 only four months after Anderson found both constitutions 
required probable cause and exigent circumstances, the Federal Supreme Court 
announced "The automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement 
requires only that there be probable cause to conduct a search." Pennsylvania v. Labron, 
518 U.S. 938(1996). 
The Court of Appeals opinion notes that the Watts case is this "court's last 
majority expression, and therefore what appears to be the court's last word on the 
automobile exception." Rigby at ~{26. Thus under the Watts standard, the Utah 
constitution continues to require the presence of both probable cause and exigent 
circumstanced to justify the warrantless search of a vehicle. 
II. The Court of Appeals lockstep analysis adopted an incorrect rule, and failed 
to follow the primacy approach as encouraged by this Court. 
Utah Courts follow the primacy model when reviewing State Constitutional 
claims. This Court has held that "When interpreting state constitutional provisions that 
are similar or identical to those in the federal constitution, we encourage a primacy 
approach." State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, at ~{15. 
6 
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Under this approach the State court looks first to state law and precedent, and 
decides matters on federal law only when the state law is not dispositive. Id. The Court's 
preference for primacy predates even the Watts case. See West v Thomson Newspapers, 
872. P.2d 999(Utah 1999). 
This Court has noted that "In developing an independent body of state search and 
seizure law, we have held that article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution often provides 
greater protections to Utah citizens than the Fourth Amendment, despite nearly identical 
language." Worwood at 16. The Court of Appeals focuses its analysis on cases that 
predate both, the lowing of the 4th amendment protection, and the cases stated above 
where this Court held Article 1 Section 14 provides a greater level of protection. See 
generally Rigby. By focusing only on these cases the Court of appeals adopted an 
erroneous rule that " ... Utah decisions follow[] the lead of federal law in this area ... " 
Rigby at '1127. This Rule and the lockstep approach which lead to it "effectively ced[es] 
interpretative authority for the state's constitution to the United States Supreme Court." 
West at 1006. Thus this Court should reverse the Court of appeals and reaffirm that Utah 
does have its own independent case law in the area of search and seizure. 
III. The warrant requirement protects citizens by ensuring a separation of 
powers. 
The purpose of the warrant requirement is to ensure a neutral magistrate reviews 
the evidence prior to an invasion of rights. This standard prevents abuse of police power. 
It also make sure that officers are not put in a position where they are expected to both 
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aggressively investigate crime and also play the role of a neutral magistrate. Consider the 
hypothetical example of an officer who feels there is something wrong at a traffic stop 
but cannot articulate why. If probable cause is the only thing required to search a car the 
officer may be tempted to claim he can smell Marijuana as a pretext to search the car. By 
requiring the officer to get a warrant, or show that other exigent circumstances, the 
officer is not placed in such a position and the rights promised in Article 1, section 14 are 
protected for all citizens. 
IV. Without exigent circumstances a warrantless search is unreasonable. 
The General Rule is that prior to performing a search an officer must obtain a 
search warrant. This Court "has consistently agreed with the view taken by the United 
States Supreme Court ... that Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable . 
• • 
11 State v. Larocco 794 P.2d 460, 470(Utah 1990). The State carries the burden of 
proving that a warrantless search is justified. Id. As discussed above the last Majority 
opinion on this matter, Watts, held that in order to justify a warrantless search of a 
vehicle, under the Utah Constitutions, the State must show both probable cause and 
exigent circumstances. See, Rigby at <J[26. 
With the U.S. Supreme Court's change in 4th amendment interpretation, other 
States have continued to require proof of exigent circumstances under their individual 
constitutions to protect the rights of their citizens. See State v. Flores, 965 A.2d 114 (N.J. 
2009), "We have never subscribed fully to the federal version of the automobile 
exception ... 11 Similarly although this issue was last addressed prior to the federal change, 
8 
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the protection afforded under, Article I. Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, as stated in 
Watts, has not changed. Thus under the Utah Constitution a warrantless search without a 
showing of exigent circumstances is still unreasonable. 
V. The facts in this case to not support the existence of exigent circumstances. 
The Court of Appeals, having determined there was no requirement for a separate 
showing of exigent circumstances, failed to address the question of exigent circumstances 
in this case. Because all of the facts are stipulated this Court can determine there were 
not exigent circumstances in this case. Exigent circumstances exist when a reasonable 
person would believe a warrantless search is necessary to prevent physical harm to 
officers, or to prevent the destruction of evidence. See Generally City of Orem v. 
Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1994)." Specific to automobiles "This court has 
ruled that exigent circumstances exist when the car is moveable, the occupants are 
alerted, and the car's contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained." 
Anderson, at 1237, quoting State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142, 144(Utah 1978) internal 
quotations omitted. The determination of exigency is based on the totality of the 
circumstances." Henrie, at 1338. 
11The amount of time necessary to obtain a warrant ... has always been considered 
in determining whether circumstances are exigent." Lorocco, at 470. See also State v . 
Rodriques, 156 P.3d 771, 782(Utah 2007). "As technology reduces the amount of time 
necessary to obtain a warrant, [The Court] would expect a corresponding increase in the 
use of warrants." Thus in order to establish exigent circumstances the State must show, 
9 
based on the totality of the circumstances, that if the officer had obtained a warrant the 
car's contents would never have been found again. 
In this case it is undisputed that the Officer's claim to smell burnt and fresh 
marijuana, along with the K9's indication on the car would have given the officer 
probable cause to request a warrant. Thus the determinative question is whether or not 
the location, number of officers on the scene, cooperation of the suspects, and the ready 
availability of electronic and telephonic warrants, eliminates any claim to exigent 
circumstances. 
The totality of circumstances in this case do not support the warrantless search. At 
the time of the search there were at least four officers and a K9 present. The stop 
although at night was is a well lit section of a residential neighborhood. The suspects 
were cooperative. The officer claimed to smell fresh and burnt marijuana. The officers 
outnumbered the suspects, the suspects were cooperative. The Officer had several means 
to obtain a warrant without leaving the scene indeed without leaving his patrol car. Thus 
the evidence would not have been lost and the warrant should have been obtained. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Rigby requests this Court reverse the Court of Appeals, and find that the Utah 
Constitution does require a separate showing of exigent circumstances to justify a 
warrantless search of an automobile. Mr. Rigby further requests this court find that based 
on the stipulated facts no such showing exists in this case. 
10 
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JUDGE STEPHEN L. ROTH authored this Opinion, in which JUDGE 
GREGORY K. ORME and SENIOR JUDGE JAMES z. DA VIS concurred. l 
ROTH, Judge: 
<][1 Zachary Rigby appeals his conviction for driving with a 
measurable controlled substance in the body and possession or 
use of a controlled substance, both class B misdemeanors. Rigby 
challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress 
evidence that the police found during a warrantless search of his 
vehicle. Rigby contends that the Utah Constitution provides its 
1. Senior Judge James Z. Davis began his work on this case as a 
member of the Utah Court of Appeals. He retired from the court, 
but thereafter became a Senior Judge. He completed his work on 
this case sitting by special assignment as authorized by law. See 
generally Utah R. Jud. Admin. 11-201(6). 
,,., 
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State v. Rigby 
citizens greater protection against unreasonable searches than 
the United States Constitution because Utah courts have 
required police officers to have both probable cause and exigent 
circumstances when performing a warrantless search under the 
automobile exception. He concedes the officers had probable 
cause to search his automobile following the traffic stop but 
asserts that they violated his constitutional rights by conducting 
the search without a warrant in the absence of exigent 
circumstances. Because we are reluctant to diverge from our 
supreme court's historical pattern of paralleling federal search 
and seizure law, we conclude that law enforcement officers were 
only required to have probable cause to justify the search of 
Rigby' s vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement. Accordingly, we affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
41(2 Ordinarily, "[w]e recite the facts in the light most 
favorable to the trial court's findings from the suppression 
hearing." State v. Giron, 943 P.2d 1114, 1115 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. 
Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 656 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). But for purposes 
of Rigby' s motion to suppress and, by extension, this appeal, 
both parties have stipulated to the facts as presented in the 
original police report. "A stipulation of fact filed with and 
accepted by a court ... is conclusive of all matters necessarily 
included in the stipulation." Yeargin, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 11, 1 20, 20 P.3d 287 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted); see also Prinsburg State Bank v. 
Abundo, 2012 UT 94,114,296 P.3d 709 ("[W]hen a court adopts a 
stipulation of the parties, the issues to which the parties have 
stipulated become settled .... " ( citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted)). Therefore, we recite the facts in accordance 
with the parties' stipulation. 
20140553-CA 2 2016 UT App 42 
State v. Rigby 
<JI:3 On March 28, 2013, a police officer pulled Rigby's 
automobile over for a stop sign violation. Upon approaching the 
vehicle, the police officer could "[i]immediately ... detect[] the 
odor of both burnt and fresh marijuana coming from the 
vehicle." Rigby and the two other occupants were "exhibiting 
physical indicators of recent marijuana use, including bloodshot 
eyes, droopy eyelids and a stoned look," along with acting 
"extremely nervous" during the traffic stop. Additional officers, 
including a K9 officer, were called to the location. The officer 
who initiated the traffic stop then "explained [to Rigby] that [he] 
was going to be searching the vehicle, not only based on the fact 
that [he] could smell the marijuana in the vehicle but because the 
drug dog had given a positive indication as well." Two officers 
then searched Rigby's vehicle; they recovered a small metal pipe 
with marijuana residue and plastic bags containing fresh 
marijuana. Rigby was arrested and charged with possession of 
drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor; driving with a 
measurable controlled substance in the body and possession or 
use of a controlled substance, both class B misdemeanors; and 
failure to stop at a stop sign, a class C misdemeanor. 
<JI:4 Rigby filed a motion to suppress "[a]ll evidence seized 
and any statement obtained" "as a result of the unlawful 
searches" conducted "in violation of the Utah Constitution." At 
the evidentiary hearing on Rigby' s motion, he conceded that the 
"odor of marijuana was sufficient" to establish probable cause 
but argued that exigent circumstances were also "required in 
order to justify a warrantless search" under the automobile 
exception. The trial court denied Rigby's motion to suppress, 
finding that "the search was reasonable under the circumstances 
and such evidence was lawfully obtained under the automobile 
exception to the warrant requirement." 
<jf 5 Rigby subsequently pled guilty to one count of driving 
with a measurable controlled substance in the body, see Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6a-517(2) (LexisNexis 2014), and one count of 
possession or use of a controlled substance, see id. § 58-37-
20140553-CA 3 2016 UT App 42 
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8(2)(a)(i).2 In entering his pleas, Rigby reserved the right to 
appeal the trial court's denial of his suppression motion. See State 
v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (describing how a 
conditional plea "specifically preserves the suppression issue for 
appeal and allows withdrawal of the plea if defendant's 
arguments in favor of suppression are accepted by the appellate 
court") (citations omitted). 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
16 On appeal, Rigby argues that although the United States 
Constitution and the Utah Constitution contain nearly 
identically phrased protections against unreasonable searches, 
the Utah Constitution provides greater protection to its citizens 
by requiring law enforcement officers to have both probable 
cause and exigent circumstances before conducting a warrantless 
search under the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement, even though the United States Supreme Court has 
held that under the federal constitution the automobile exception 
requires only probable cause. "Matters of constitutional 
interpretation are questions of law that we review for 
correctness, and we provide no deference to the district court's 
legal conclusions." State v. Gonzalez-Camargo, 2012 UT App 366, 
<J[ 15, 293 P.3d 1121 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Menzies v. State, 2014 UT 40, <J[ 27, 344 P.3d 581 
("Constitutional issues ... are questions of law that we review 
for correctness .... " (first omission in original) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted)). 
2. Because the statutory provisions in effect at the relevant times 
do not differ materially from the statutory provisions now in 
effect, we cite the current version of the Utah Code for 
convenience. 
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ANALYSIS 
'ii? Both the United States Constitution and the Utah 
Constitution contain nearly identical provisions safeguarding an 
individual's right against unreasonable searches and seizures.3 
Both protect "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures" by the government. U.S. Const. amend. 
IV; see also Utah Const. art. I, § 14. Some time ago, the Utah 
Supreme Court observed that "Article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution reads nearly verbatim with the fourth amendment, 
and thus [the] Court has never drawn any distinctions between 
the protections afforded by the respective constitutional 
provisions. Rather, the Court has always considered the 
protections afforded to be one and the same." State v. Watts, 750 
P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1988). The question presented here is 
whether Utah courts should continue to follow this principle and 
track the relatively recent evolution of the automobile exception 
under federal law or chart its own path under the Utah 
Constitution. To address this question, we first trace the history 
of the automobile exception under both federal and state case 
law. Next we examine the status of the automobile exception 
under federal law in light of the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938 (1996) (per 
curiam). Finally, we consider whether Utah is likely to continue 
to track federal law after Labron with regard to the automobile 
exception or chart a new path under the Utah Constitution. 
3. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides, 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
(continued ... ) 
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I. The Automobile Exception to the Warrant Requirement 
<JIB Because warrantless searches are "per se unreasonable," 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967), "[p ]olice officers 
generally need a warrant to search a place in which a person has 
a reasonable expectation of privacy," State v. Boyles, 2015 UT 
App 185, <JI 10, 356 P.3d 687 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 
154, 164 (1978)); see also id. (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 164) (noting 
that "[b ]efore issuing a search warrant, a magistrate must 
determine that probable cause exists to conduct the search"). 
"There are, of course, exceptions to the general rule ... one [ of 
which] is the so-called 'automobile exception' .... " California v. 
Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985). Historically, under the 
automobile exception, police were permitted to search an 
automobile without a warrant so long as both probable cause 
and exigent circumstances existed. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 
399 U.S. 42, 48-51 (1970); State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 
1978). 
( ... continued) 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Utah Constitution is phrased very 
similarly: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
Utah Const. art. I,§ 14. 
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A. The Automobile Exception Under Federal Case Law 
19 In 1925, the United States Supreme Court decided Carroll 
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), the seminal case addressing 
the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant 
requirement. In Carroll, the Court determined that while an 
individual has a constitutionally protected privacy interest in an 
automobile, the degree of protection is lessened "because the 
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in 
which the warrant must be sought." Id. at 153. This mobility 
principle has continued to be a factor in the Supreme Court's 
approach to automobile search cases since Carroll. See, e.g., 
Labron, 518 U.S. at 940; New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112-13 
(1986); Carney, 471 U.S. at 392-93; South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 
U.S. 364, 367 (1976); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 588-89 (1974); 
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1973); Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 459-60 {1971); Chambers, 399 U.S. at 52; 
Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 59 (1967). 
,IlO The Court has recognized, however, that "ready mobility 
is not the only basis for the [automobile] exception." Carney, 471 
U.S. at 391. Rather, the exception is also justified because of the 
"reduced expectations of privacy" arising from the "pervasive 
regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public 
highways." Id. at 392 (citing Cady, 413 U.S. at 440-41); see also 
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 345 (2009) (recognizing that "a 
motorist's privacy interest in his vehicle is less substantial than 
in his home"); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303-07 (1999) 
(holding that both drivers and passengers have a reduced 
expectation of privacy in an automobile); Class, 475 U.S. at 113 
("[A]utomobiles are justifiably the subject of pervasive 
regulation by the State."); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 
12-13 (1977) ("One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor 
vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom 
serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal 
effects.") ( citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by 
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 590. 
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111 Historically, the automobile exception has required two 
circumstances. First, there must be probable cause for a search. 
See Chambers, 399 U.S. at 48 ("[A]utomobiles ... may be searched 
without a warrant in circumstances that would not justify the 
search without a warrant of a house or an office, provided that 
there is probable cause .... "). And second, there must be exigent 
circumstances. See id. at 50-51 ("But the circumstances that 
furnish probable cause to search a particular auto for particular 
articles are most often unforeseeable; moreover, the opportunity 
to search is fleeting since a car is readily movable .... Only in 
exigent circumstances will the judgment of the police as to 
probable cause serve as a sufficient authorization for a search."). 
The required exigency was usually found to inhere in a factor 
fundamental to the exception itself, i.e., the characteristic 
mobility of an automobile. See, e.g., Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 569 
( citing Carroll, 267 U.S. at 158-59) (stating that "a warrantless 
search of an automobile, based upon probable cause to believe 
that the vehicle contained evidence of crime in light of an 
exigency arising out of the likely disappearance of the vehicle, 
[does] not contravene the Warrant Clause of the Fourth 
Amendment"). 
112 In 1996, however, the Supreme Court concluded that the 
warrantless search of an automobile no longer required separate 
consideration of exigent circumstances, so long as there was 
probable cause for the search. Labron, 518 U.S. at 940. The Court 
held that "ready mobility [was] exigency sufficient to excuse 
failure to obtain a search warrant once probable cause to conduct 
the search is clear." Id. (citing Carney, 471 U.S. at 390-91). In 
reaching this conclusion the Court reasoned that in addition to 
the mobility principle, its prior recognition of the "reduced 
expectation of privacy in an automobile" justified recasting the 
description of the automobile exception to permit a warrantless 
search "[i]f a car is readily mobile and probable cause 
exists ... without [anything] more." Id. (citing Carney, 471 U.S. at 
393). 
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B. The Automobile Exception Under Utah Case Law 
<j[13 Historically, Utah case law has mirrored federal case law 
with respect to the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement. Utah cases, like their federal counterparts, have 
recognized that "[w]arrantless searches are per se unreasonable 
unless undertaken pursuant to a recognized exception to the 
warrant requirement." State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 
1992) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). Our 
case law has also echoed federal case law in recognizing that 
"[t]here are ... several exceptions to the warrant requirement ... 
includ[ing] ... [the] search of an automobile based on probable 
cause." State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1985) (citing 
Chambers, 399 U.S. 42); see also State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142, 144--45 
(Utah 1978) (discussing the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement and quoting Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51, with 
approval). 
<j[14 Our cases have also described the rationale for the 
automobile exception much like federal cases have. For example, 
in the 1948 case City of Price v. Jaynes, while discussing the 
validity of a city ordinance modeled after the Fourth 
Amendment, our supreme court recognized that under federal 
law an individual has a lessened degree of protection in some 
instances based on whether the place to be searched is mobile. 
191 P.2d 606, 608 (Utah 1948). And in City of Price the Utah 
Supreme Court enunciated and followed the principles first 
announced in Carroll: 
[The Fourth Amendment] has been construed 
practically since the beginning of the Government, 
as recognizing a necessary difference between a 
search of a store, dwelling house or other structure 
in respect of which a proper official warrant 
readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, 
motor boat, wagon or automobile for contraband 
goods where it is not practicable to serve a warrant 
20140553-CA 9 2016 UT App 42 
('.~\ 
~ 
State v. Rigby 
because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of 
the jurisdiction in which the warrant is sought. 
Id. at 608 (quoting Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153); see also State v. Dorsey, 
731 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1986) (citing Carroll, 267 U.S. 132, ("It 
has long been held that warrantless vehicle searches are not 
invalid under the Fourth Amendment if probable cause for a 
search exists.")). And subsequent to City of Price, the court has 
repeatedly referred to the mobility principle as justification for 
the automobile exception. See, e.g., State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, 
<J{ 11, 229 P.3d 650; State v. James, 2000 UT 80, <JI 10, 13 P.3d 576; 
State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1234-37 (Utah 1996) (plurality 
opinion); Limb, 581 P.2d at 144-45; State v. Farnsworth, 519 P.2d 
244, 247 (Utah 1974); State v. Shields, 503 P.2d 848, 849 (Utah 
1972). 
<J{15 Further, like the federal courts, our supreme court has 
recognized that in addition to an automobile's ready mobility, 
the automobile exception finds support in reduced privacy 
expectations. For instance, in State v. Baker, the Utah Supreme 
Court noted that the "automobile exception to the warrant rule 
arises because occupants of a vehicle have a lesser expectation of 
privacy due to the mobile nature of vehicles and their highly 
regulated status." 2010 UT 18, <j[ 11 (alteration, citation, and 
internal quotation marks omitted); accord James, 2000 UT 80, <JI 10 
("Due to the mobile nature of vehicles and their highly-regulated 
status, persons traveling in vehicles have a lesser expectation of 
privacy than they would have within a private dwelling."); see 
also State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-34 (Utah 1994); State v. 
Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989). 
<J[16 And like the federal courts until Labron, the Utah Supreme 
Court has historically described the automobile exception as 
requiring both probable cause and exigent circumstances to 
justify a police officer in the warrantless search of an automobile. 
See, e.g., State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 1984) ("For 
[the automobile] exception to apply, the police must have 
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probable cause to believe that the automobile contains either 
contraband or evidence of a crime and that they may be lost if 
not immediately seized."); see also State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 
470 (Utah 1990) (plurality opinion) (approving the logic of 
Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, and re-iterating the requirement that 
police officers have both probable cause and exigent 
circumstances to justify a search under the automobile 
exception); Limb, 581 P.2d at 144 (citing Carroll, 267 U.S. 132, with 
approval and holding that probable cause and exigent 
circumstances existed to justify a warrantless search of an 
automobile). Also in line with the federal approach, the Utah 
Supreme Court has recognized that the required exigency 
generally arises from the inherent mobility of an automobile. See 
Shields, 503 P.2d at 849 ("In exigent circumstances, the judgment 
of a police officer as to probable cause will serve as sufficient 
authorization for a search, i.e., a search warrant is unnecessary 
where there is probable cause to search an automobile stopped 
on the highway, for the car is movable, ... and the car's contents 
may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained."). 
II. The Automobile Exception Under Pennsylvania v. Labron 
<_[17 On July 1, 1996, the United States Supreme Court decided 
the companion cases of Pennsylvania v. Kilgore and Pennsylvania 
v. Labron in a consolidated opinion. See Pennsylvania v. Labron, 
518 U.S. 938 (1996) (per curiam). In both cases, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court had held that the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution required law enforcement officers to 
obtain a warrant before searching a vehicle unless both probable 
cause and exigent circumstances were present. Id. at 938-39. In 
particular, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had held that the 
warrantless search of Labron's vehicle was unjustified because 
although law enforcement officers had probable cause to search 
the trunk of the vehicle for suspected drug activity, there were 
no exigent circumstances justifying the search because "the 
police had time to secure a warrant." Id. at 939--40. In a relatively 
short per curiam decision, the Supreme Court concluded that it 
20140553-CA 11 2016 UT App 42 
State v. Rigby 
was incorrect under the Fourth Amendment for courts to require 
law enforcement officers to have both probable cause and exigent 
circumstances for the warrantless search of an automobile. Id. 
The Court began its analysis with a brief review of the history of 
the Fourth Amendment's automobile exception. Id. (first citing 
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1985); then citing 
Carroll, 267 U.S. 132). The Court noted that the first cases 
underlying the automobile exception "were based on the 
automobile's 'ready mobility111 because '"ready mobility[]' [is] an 
exigency sufficient to excuse failure to obtain a search warrant 
once probable cause to conduct the search is clear." Id. But the 
Court explained that "[m]ore recent cases provide a further 
justification [for the automobile exception]" based on an 
"individual's reduced expectation of privacy in an automobile[] 
[because of] ... its pervasive regulation." Id. (citing Carne:y, 471 
U.S. at 391-92). The Court concluded, "If a car is readily mobile 
and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the 
Fourth Amendment thus permits police to search the vehicle 
without more." Id. (citing Carney, 471 U.S. at 393). The Court has 
subsequently stated that Labron stands for the rule that under 
federal law, "the 'automobile exception' has no separate 
exigency requirement." Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466-67 
(1999) (per curiam) (discussing Labron, 518 U.S. 938).4 
4. In Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465 (1999) (per curiam), the 
Supreme Court stated that it had been "clear" since United States 
v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), that the automobile exception had no 
exigency requirement and characterized Labron as simply 
reiterating that principle: 
The Fourth Amendment generally requires police 
to secure a warrant before conducting a search. 
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1985). As 
we recognized nearly 75 years ago in Carroll v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), there is an 
exception to this requirement for searches of 
(continued ... ) 
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III. The Automobile Exception Under Article I, Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution 
<J[18 The Utah Supreme Court has not specifically considered 
the effect of Labron on Utah law. And though we have 
( ... continued) 
vehicles. And under our established precedent, the 
"automobile exception" has no separate exigency 
requirement. We made this clear in United States v. 
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 (1982), when we said that in 
cases where there was probable cause to search a 
vehicle "a search is not unreasonable if based on 
facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, 
even though a warrant has not been actually obtained." 
In a case with virtually identical facts to this one 
( even down to the bag of cocaine in the trunk of the 
car), Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938 (1996) (per 
curiam), we repeated that the automobile exception 
does not have a separate exigency requirement: 
"If a car is readily mobile and probable cause 
exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth 
Amendment ... permits police to search the 
vehicle without more." Id. at 940. 
Dyson, 527 U.S. at 466-67 (emphasis in original). But Labron itself 
did not mention Ross and seemed at the time to mark a point of 
departure from the exigency requirement. Certainly, the 
conclusion Dyson draws from Ross seems more apparent in 
Labron' s clarifying light than it may have been before then. It is 
tempting to surmise that Labron's per curiam nature may have 
signaled that the Court did not consider its decision to be so 
much a departure from the past as an acknowledgement that, 
given its foundation in the mobility principle, the exigency 
requirement may already have largely lost its role as an 
independent component of the automobile exception. 
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mentioned Labron on occasion, this court has not had the 
opportunity to specifically analyze Article I, Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution in light of that decision. In fact, each of the 
few times this court has cited Labron, we did so to support a 
conclusion-in the context of analyzing federal law-that a law 
enforcement officer's search of an appellant's automobile was 
justified under the automobile exception to the Fourth 
Amendment's warrant requirement because the officer had 
probable cause. See State v. Despain, 2007 UT App 367, 1114, 16, 
173 P.3d 213 (recognizing that the requirements to justify a 
search under the automobile exception have "fluctuated in the 
past," but ultimately relying on both Dyson and Labron to 
conclude that "federal law ha[d] been clarified" and therefore 
"[t]he officers' search ... was justified under the automobile 
exception to the Fourth Amendment[] . . . because the officers 
had probable cause"); State v. Griffith, 2006 UT App 291, <J[<JI 6-8, 
141 P.3d 602 (relying on Dyson and Labron to conclude that 
because the defendant's vehicle was mobile the officer needed 
only probable cause to search the vehicle under the Fourth 
Amendment); State v. Mehew, 2003 UT App 166U, para. 3 ( citing 
Labron, 518 U.S. at 940) (holding that because the defendant's 
vehicle was mobile and probable cause existed the warrantless 
search of the vehicle was valid under the automobile exception). 
Further, although not specifically citing Labron, we have applied 
the rule Labron recognized-that the automobile exception, 
under federal law, has no separate exigency requirement-on a 
number of occasions. See, e.g., State v. Juma, 2012 UT App 27, c_[ 9, 
270 P.3d 564; State v. Butler, 2011 UT App 281, 112, 263 P.3d 463; 
In re D.A.B., 2009 UT App 169, c_[ 7, 214 P.3d 878; State v. Griffith, 
2006 UT App 291, <J[ 6, 141 P.3d 602. And it appears that the only 
time we have been asked to consider whether Article I, Section 
14 of the Utah Constitution would yield a more restrictive 
interpretation of the automobile exception than Labron, we 
declined to do so because the state constitutional issues were 
inadequately briefed. See Despain, 2007 UT App 367, 1 12 
(explaining that the "[d]efendant mentioned both the Utah and 
United States Constitutions in his opening brief," but "did not 
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conduct a separate analysis of the protections afforded by each" 
and, as a consequence, this court "refrained from engaging in [a] 
state constitutional analysis" of the automobile exception and 
affirmed the district court based on Labron' s holding that the 
Fourth Amendment required only probable cause for the 
warrantless search of an automobile). 
'f[19 Here, Rigby acknowledges that both "the U.S. 
Constitution and the Utah Constitution contain almost identical 
protections against unreasonable searches" and that "in 1996 the 
U.S. Supreme Court [in Labron] changed the requirements under 
the U.S. Constitution to require probabl[e] cause only," no 
longer requiring a separate showing of exigency. Rigby argues, 
however, that "[n]o such decision has been issued regarding the 
status of the Utah Constitution." And therefore, according to 
Rigby, "under the Utah Constitution an officer must still have 
both probable cause and exigent circumstances to justify the 
warrantless search of an automobile." Unlike the appellant in 
Despain, we believe that Rigby analyzes the issue in a manner 
sufficient to warrant our consideration of whether, in light of 
Labron, the Utah Constitution now provides its citizens greater 
protection against unreasonable searches than the United States 
Constitution by continuing to require that police officers have 
both probable cause and exigent circumstances to justify a 
warrantless search under the automobile exception. Rigby 
primarily draws support for his argument that Utah ought to 
depart from the federal path with regard to the automobile 
exception from three opinions, which seem to be the Utah 
Supreme Court's last ventures into the realm of the Utah 
Constitution's relationship to the automobile exception prior to 
Labron: State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988), State v. Larocco, 
794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) (plurality opinion), and State v. 
Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1996) (plurality opinion). We 
address each case in order to determine whether our supreme 
court has established a discernible distinction between the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 
I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution that may apply here. 
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A. State v. Watts 
120 In State v. Watts a majority of the Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed the appellant's conviction for unlawful production and 
possession of marijuana. Watts, 750 P.2d at 1225. The appellant 
in Watts had unsuccessfully moved the trial court to suppress 
evidence based upon the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. Id. at 1220. While ultimately holding that private 
searches did not fall within the protection of the Utah 
Constitution, the Watts court acknowledged and affirmed its 
historical pattern of interpreting both the federal and the state 
constitutions as providing identical protections: 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution reads 
nearly verbatim with the fourth amendment, and 
thus this Court has never drawn any distinctions 
between the protections afforded by the respective 
constitutional provisions. Rather, the Court has 
always considered the protections afforded to be 
one and the same. We do not depart from that view 
in this case, and hold that unreasonable private 
searches are not subject to the protection of article 
I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
Id. at 1221 (footnotes omitted). 
<JI21 Although Rigby acknowledges the court's reasoning, he 
points to a footnote in Watts in which the court opined that 
"choosing to give the Utah Constitution a somewhat different 
construction may prove to be an appropriate method for 
insulating this state's citizens from the vagaries of inconsistent 
interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the federal 
courts." Id. at 1221 n.8. Rigby interprets this footnote as 
indicating that "[t]he Watts court reserved the right to 
distinguish between the protections afforded by the two 
Constitutions." But the footnote's indication of the court's 
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willingness to consider a different direction at some point in the 
future must be considered in light of the majority's unequivocal 
decision not to "depart ... from [ the court's] consistent 
refusal ... to interpret article I, section 14 of [the Utah] 
constitution in a manner different from the fourth amendment to 
the federal constitution." Id. Therefore, the supreme court's 
statement in Watts reinforces Utah's historical pattern of tracking 
federal law in this area both in principle and in practice while 
keeping open the possibility of departing from that pattern, 
should the circumstances undergirding it change in some 
significant way. Cf State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, «JI 11, 164 P.3d 
397 ("In cases involving Fourth Amendment questions under the 
United States Constitution, we review mixed questions of law 
and fact under a correctness standard in the interest of creating 
uniform legal rules for law enforcement.'' ( emphasis added)). 
B. State v. Larocco 
<Jl22 In State v. Larocco a plurality of the supreme court (two 
justices concurring and one concurring only in the result) urged 
departure from continued reliance on federal jurisprudence as 
the basis for interpreting Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. Larocco, 794 P.2d at 470-71. The plurality reasoned 
that although both federal and Utah courts had historically 
interpreted the automobile exception to require both probable 
cause and exigent circumstances, id. at 470, exigency had become 
essentially a given based on a too-simplistic notion about the 
ready mobility of automobiles, id. at 469. The Larocco plurality 
thus concluded that an automobile's mere potential for mobility 
ought no longer to be sufficient to satisfy the exigency 
requirement under the Utah Constitution. Rather, a two-step 
process was required: first, it should be established that officers 
had probable cause for a search; then in order to meet the 
required level of exigency, "[t]he next step requires justification 
of the warrantless search by showing either that the 
procurement of a warrant would have jeopardized the safety of 
the police officers or that the evidence was likely to have been 
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lost or destroyed." Id. at 470. In other words, for the automobile 
exception to apply, the State must go beyond the general concept 
of ready mobility and show exigency particularized to the actual 
circumstances at hand. Thus, in Larocco, there was probable 
cause for a search, but the State failed to show that the 
presumably stolen automobile, while operable and likely mobile, 
would no longer have been available to search if the officers had 
taken the time to obtain a warrant. As a result, the warrantless 
search was not justified. Id. at 470-71. 
<J[23 But Larocco's plurality status "represents the view of only 
two justices ... and is therefore not the law of this state." 
Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1234 n.5. Accordingly, the holding from 
Watts remained "the law of this state." See id.; see also State v. 
Giron, 943 P.2d 1114, 1121 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ("Because Larocco 
was only a plurality opinion, its analysis is not binding."). 
Therefore, we cannot conclude that the plurality decision in 
Larocco signals our supreme court's intent to interpret the state 
constitution to provide different protections than the federal 
constitution. See State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 996 n.3 (noting that 
"a plurality opinion ... does not establish precedent"). A 
subsequent plurality decision, State v. Anderson, underscores this 
notion. 
C. State v. Anderson 
'Il24 In State v. Anderson, issued just months before Labron,5 the 
Utah Supreme Court was again asked to depart from its practice 
of interpreting in tandem the search and seizure requirements of 
the state and federal constitutions in the context of the 
automobile exception. See Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1235. But the 
Anderson plurality rejected the approach taken by the Larocco 
5. State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1996), was issued on 
February 2, 1996, while Labron, 518 U.S. 938, was issued 
approximately five months later, on July 1, 1996. 
20140553-CA 18 2016 UT App 42 
State v. Rigby 
plurality and affirmed that Utah would continue to track the 
federal path in this area: "Because this portion of Larocco 
coincides with federal law, we agree with those who joined the 
Larocco plurality that article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution 
requires that warrantless searches of automobiles be justified by 
a showing of probable cause and exigent circumstances." Id. at 
1237. Based on this statement, Rigby urges us to acknowledge 
Anderson as the irrefutable last word on the issue. In other 
words, Rigby argues that even if Larocco's more restrictive 
plurality approach is not binding, we should conclude at a 
minimum that the Anderson plurality has accurately articulated 
Utah law just prior to Labron as holding that probable cause 
alone is not sufficient to justify the warrantless search of an 
automobile but that exigent circumstances are also required. 
Rigby contends that the Anderson court "went into great detail to 
explain that under both the Federal and Utah constitutions the 
warrantless search of an automobile required 'both probable 
cause and exigent circumstances."' (Quoting Anderson, 910 P.2d 
at 1236.) 
<[25 While that is true, Anderson does not support Rigby's 
position as strongly as he contends, because Rigby does not 
acknowledge the context in which that explanation occurred. 
Although the Anderson plurality recognized that in the past, 
federal Fourth Amendment law had been "the source of much 
confusion among judges, lawyers, and police," it went on to 
explain that our supreme court "ha[s] endeavored toward 
uniformity in the application of the search and seizure 
requirements of the state and federal constitutions, particularly 
since the respective provisions are practically identical," 
cautioning that "[a]n opposite approach could lead to 
unfavorable results." Id. at 1235-36 ( citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). In accordance with this principle, 
recognizing that at the time Anderson was issued, federal law 
"require[d] that such a search be premised on probable cause 
and exigent circumstances," id. at 1237, the plurality concluded 
that the Utah Constitution required the same: "[T]he Utah 
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Constitution requires that warrantless searches of automobiles 
be justified by a showing of probable cause and exigent 
circumstances," id. Thus, rather than fixing the combination of 
probable cause and exigent circumstances as the invariable 
components of the automobile exception under the Utah 
Constitution, Anderson can be read to express the plurality's 
view that the Utah Supreme Court had expressed a distinct and 
continuing preference to have Article 1, Section 14 interpreted 
consistently with the Fourth Amendment in order to avoid the 
"unfavorable results" that a different approach "could lead to." 
Id. at 1235 ("For these reasons, Utah courts should construe 
article I, section 14 in a manner similar to constructions of the 
Fourth amendment except in compelling circumstances." (citing, 
among other cases, Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221 & n.8)). 
D. The Current State of the Automobile Exception Under 
Utah Law 
<][26 The plurality decisions in Larocco and Anderson present 
two competing approaches. On the one hand, the Larocco 
plurality analyzes the automobile exception to require a 
complex, policy-based analysis giving due consideration to the 
principle that the Utah Constitution ought to be independently 
analyzed with the potential for affording Utah citizens greater 
liberties than the federal. Larocco, 794 P.2d at 469-71. On the 
other hand, the Anderson plurality firmly rejects that approach 
and urges that the court instead adhere to the historical pattern 
of following the path of federal law to avoid confusion and 
"unfavorable results." Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1234-37. But 
although the pluralities in Larocco and Anderson began an 
internal dialogue that could eventually lead to changes in Utah's 
approach, we are effectively left with Watts as the supreme 
court's last majority expression, and therefore what appears to 
be the coures last word on the automobile exception. And while 
Watts held that the automobile exception required both probable 
cause and exigent circumstances, its reasoning was firmly based 
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on the principle of tracking the path set by the United States 
Supreme Court. Watts, 750 P.2d at 1220-21 & n.8. 
127 Certainly, Rigby's contention that Utah courts ought now 
to depart from the federal interpretive path and determine that 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides Utah 
citizens with more expansive rights than those guaranteed under 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution finds 
resonance in the language of some prior cases. See State v. Brake, 
2004 UT 95, 116 n.2, 103 P.3d 699 (first citing Anderson, 910 P.2d 
at 1234-37; and then citing Larocco, 794 P.2d at 469-70) (declining 
"the implicit invitation" inherent in the circumstances of the case 
"to revisit the dormant but unresolved debate in this court over 
the merits of whether and when to depart from federal Fourth 
Amendment doctrine and chart our own course in the realm of 
search and seizure law based on the protections afforded by 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution"); State v. DeBooy, 
2000 UT 32, <j[ 12, 996 P.2d 546 ("While this court's interpretation 
of article I, section 14 has often paralleled the United States 
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, we 
have stated that we will not hesitate to give the Utah 
Constitution a different construction where doing so will more 
appropriately protect the rights of this state's citizens."); Larocco, 
794 P.2d at 465 ("[W]e have by no means ruled out the 
possibility of [ drawing distinctions between the protections 
afforded by article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the 
fourth amendment of the United States Constitution]." (quoting 
Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221 n.8)); Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221 n.8 ("In 
declining to depart in this case from our consistent refusal 
heretofore to interpret article I, section 14 of our constitution in a 
manner different from the fourth amendment to the federal 
constitution, we have by no means ruled out the possibility of 
doing so in some future case. Indeed, choosing to give the Utah 
Constitution a somewhat different construction may prove to be 
an appropriate method for insulating this state's citizens from 
the vagaries of inconsistent interpretations given to the fourth 
amendment by the federal courts."). But the decades-long 
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pattern of Utah decisions following the lead of federal law in this 
area before Larocco and Anderson-a pattern acknowledged and 
applied in Watts-is established enough that the burden must be 
on the challenging party to persuade us that a change is 
justifiable, and Rigby has not carried that burden here. Rather, 
the strength of that pattern and the very intensity of the 
disagreement between the Larocco and Anderson pluralities deter 
us from concluding that the current court would mark Labron as 
Utah's point of departure from the path of federal law on the 
automobile exception. 
128 And even were we tempted to do so, 
as an intermediate court of appeals, we would be 
reluctant, in any event, to become overly creative 
in fashioning a state constitutional rule different 
from the federal rule. Such a task lies more 
appropriately with the Utah Supreme Court as "the 
ultimate and final arbiter of the meaning of the 
provisions in the Utah Declaration of Rights and 
the primary protector of individual liberties." 
State v. Jackson, 937 P.2d 545, 550 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (first 
quoting Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1240 (Stewart, J., concurring in the 
result); then citing State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89, 95 n.7 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987) (stating that any departure from Fourth Amendment 
case law "should be announced by our state's supreme court, not 
this court"), rev'd on other grounds, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990)); cf 
DIRECTV v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2015 UT 93, 11 44-46 
(declining to "embark on a constitutional[] ... journey" when 
asked to extend federal dormant commerce clause precedent 
because the United States Supreme Court's current approach 
does not seem to point in that direction and because it is not the 
province of the Utah Supreme Court to embark on that journey). 
Accordingly, we decline to depart from the path of federal law 
and conclude that under the automobile exception, as 
interpreted in Labron, the law enforcement officers in this case 
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were only required to have probable cause to justify the search 
of Rigby' s vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement of either the federal or Utah constitutions. See State 
v. Despain, 2007 UT App 367, <JI<JI 13-16, 173 P.3d 213. Because 
there is no dispute that the officers here had probable cause for a 
search, the trial court did not err in denying Rigby' s motion to 
suppress.6 
CONCLUSION 
<J[29 For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the trial 
court is affirmed. 
6. Because we follow Labron' s lead and conclude that no separate 
showing of exigent circumstances is required under the 
automobile exception, we do not reach Rigby' s argument that 
the availability of warrants by telephone or other electronic 
media means that there was no exigency here as a matter of law. 
Cf State v. Rodriguez, 2007 UT 15, 160, 156 P.3d 771 ("[P]ractical 
considerations associated with warrant acquisition remain 
central to inquiries into whether exigent circumstances justify a 
warrantless search."); State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 470 (Utah 
1990) (plurality opinion) (recognizing "[t]he amount of time 
necessary to obtain a warrant" is a factor used to "determin[e] 
whether circumstances are exigent"); City of Orem v. Henrie, 868 
P.2d 1384, 1391-92 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (identifying "the 
availability of a telephonic warrant" as one consideration when 
determining whether exigency exists). 
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